Building Houses for Judges: A Necessary Step

Nyesom Wike, who serves as the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), has defended the initiative to construct residences for judges, stating that it is justifiable.

This statement comes in light of comments made by human rights lawyer Femi Falana (SAN), who voiced concerns during a recent interview. Falana asserted that such developments are unconstitutional and might undermine the integrity of the judiciary.

In September, the Federal Executive Council granted approval for the creation of 40 housing units designated for judges and justices within the FCT. These units will be located in the Katampe District, with allocations consisting of 20 for the FCT High Court, 10 for the Federal High Court, and 10 for the Court of Appeal.

The move faced backlash, with Falana warning that providing judges with such benefits could lead to biased rulings. He remarked, “Judges cannot be perceived as receiving favoritism in the form of houses or cars while they decide cases.”

In response, Wike’s Senior Special Assistant on Public Communications, Lere Olayinka, stated that Falana’s criticisms stem from a misunderstanding and emotional reaction towards the Minister’s actions.

Olayinka emphasized that providing housing for judges is aligned with the responsibilities of the Federal Government and does not compromise the principle of separation of powers.

He further explained that while democratic systems maintain a separation of powers, they also function under checks and balances, indicating that independence between government branches is never absolute.

Olayinka posed several questions to illustrate his point: “If judges were to manage the construction of their residences, would they not still require land from the FCT Ministry? And if the concern is about influence, isn’t securing land sufficient?”

He added, “The funding for these housing units must be approved by the National Assembly—an entity of politicians who frequently have legal disputes requiring judicial resolution. Should we then suggest that funding discussions might sway judges?”

Olayinka also questioned whether the presence of security forces, who are tasked with protecting judges, implies improper influence over judicial decisions, given that these agencies may have ongoing cases with the courts.

He continued, “If anti-corruption bodies investigate judges for potential wrongdoing, should that also be avoided to prevent influencing their work?”

Olayinka humorously suggested additional extreme measures that would be impractical, such as judges isolating themselves from social contacts to avoid perceived influences.

He advised Falana and other critics to focus on ensuring judges feel secure and comfortable in their roles rather than attacking the government’s responsibility to support them.

Olayinka referenced the United States, stating that despite its Supreme Court justices having affiliations with political parties, they consistently perform their duties without accusations of undue influence from appointed officials.

He noted that the nomination and confirmation process for U.S. justices does not involve the Judicial Conference or the Administrative Office of the Courts, illustrating a functional separation of roles within the judiciary.

In conclusion, Olayinka reiterated that even in a politically charged environment, judges are capable of fulfilling their responsibilities impartially, highlighting the nature of judicial work in the U.S. system.