Brian Jeffrey
The General Secretary To Lam and the Party Central Committee are actively advancing a transformation aimed at enhancing Vietnam’s political system. VietNamNet is initiating a sequence of expert interviews to explore effective strategies for this vital reform.
In this segment, VietNamNet engages with Associate Professor and Doctor of Science Vo Dai Luoc, who previously led the Institute of World Economics and Politics.
The commitment of General Secretary To Lam and the Party Central Committee towards a revolutionary change in the political system stems from the realization that “The structure of our political system is fundamentally based on a model designed decades ago, which falters under current conditions and often contradicts development principles.” How do you view these steps as a researcher?
Since the early 1990s, nations like those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have successfully transitioned from outdated systems, witnessing tremendous progress. This discussion particularly focuses on the model of governance.
China opted for socialism with its own characteristics, while Vietnam adopted a socialist-oriented market economy. Both nations have retained political systems that reflect their historical foundations, albeit with certain modifications over the years.
While China boasts impressive growth over the last few decades, it now grapples with formidable domestic and international challenges, leading to a decline in its economic growth from 9-10% to around 5% or less. There are growing calls in China for a shift to a different developmental model as the current one proves unsatisfactory.
Vietnam similarly faces significant developmental hurdles, particularly post-Doi Moi (Renovation), intensifying the urgency for a political shift. The leadership is keenly focused on achieving this revolution, which also necessitates a transformation in mindset and development strategies.
Post-Doi Moi, Vietnam initiated multiple reforms in its political structure. Notably, at the 8th Central Committee Conference of the 7th Party Congress on January 16, 1995, calls for merging and reducing structures were robust. Can you share insights on that reform era?
Initially, Vietnam’s political framework mirrored that of the Soviet Union, where the state dictated every aspect of production, distribution, and pricing.
A centralized economy demanded a plethora of ministries and departments. For instance, we had entities like the State Pricing Committee and various ministries overseeing trade and industry.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade managed exports, while the Ministry of Domestic Trade organized production and allocation plans for key resources like rice and pesticides, prioritizing heavy industry development.
As Vietnam shifted to a market-oriented approach after the 6th Party Congress, the functional relevance of these ministries diminished, leading to gradual mergers and reductions. The Ministry of Domestic Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade eventually combined into the Ministry of Trade, which, over time, merged with the Ministry of Industry to form the current Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Were there any hurdles during these mergers?
The onset of the Doi Moi policy during the 6th Party Congress, followed by the 7th Party Congress’s implementation strategies, was met with a prevailing spirit of reform. Consequently, there was minimal resistance during that period.
General Secretary Do Muoi and Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet consistently sought expert advice across various fields to steer reforms effectively. Their receptive mindset toward learning and cooperation with experts facilitated informed decision-making across a range of initiatives, including system restructuring and key infrastructure projects.
How do you perceive the ongoing “revolution” aimed at streamlining the political framework?
Historically, General Secretary Truong Chinh’s decisive action to eliminate the subsidized economic management system marked the start of Doi Moi. This reform narrative continued under General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and found further grounding with General Secretary Do Muoi’s policies, paving the way for economic transition.
Presently, General Secretary To Lam and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh represent a new wave of hope. They are addressing urgent challenges both nationally and globally, bringing a practical and determined approach to reform, with a focus on future-oriented development.
While streamlining government operations and ministry mergers are pivotal, it is equally essential to delineate the roles of the market and state clearly. Abolishing the “ask-give” model is crucial for establishing a modern, relevant legal framework that respects the constitutional rights of businesses and citizens alike.
General Secretary To Lam mentions that “institutions are the bottlenecks of bottlenecks.” What is your perspective on the pressure for institutional reform?
This statement is spot on and addresses the core issue. The World Bank identifies Vietnam’s institutional framework as the primary barrier to progress. I have made several suggestions to authorities highlighting the necessity of dismantling this bottleneck for the country’s advancement.
Having served as an advisor to Prime Minister Do Muoi and on advisory committees for Prime Ministers Vo Van Kiet and Phan Van Khai, I have observed many shortcomings in Vietnam’s legislative processes that must be resolved.
The Party Central Committee and Politburo set policies and guidelines, which the Government and National Assembly use to draft and enact laws. Unfortunately, these often take the form of broad or framework laws with numerous qualifiers, complicating efficient execution.
Furthermore, at the level of decrees, ministries introduce stipulations that, if not expressly authorized by the Prime Minister, may manifest as circulars. Below these circulars, businesses and citizens face additional arbitrary directives that still require adherence.
Moreover, conflicting legal documents create confusion; compliance with one law may inadvertently breach another.
This results in many well-intentioned policies and well-structured laws failing to achieve their intended effectiveness.
